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Abstract: The scope of this note is to point out that high growth rates must be accompanied 
by current account surpluses financing the internal debt service as a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a debt-reduction strategy. The recipe is applied in the case of Greece 
which, looking back at the pre-crisis period, has been experiencing substantial consumption-
led growth following extensive foreign borrowing. 
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1. Introduction 
This note does not aspire to add to the evaluation of the economic policy recipes 
followed since 2009 as these have been implemented by means of the measures 
taken following the Memorandum signed between the Greek government and the 
Troika (IMF/ECB/EC). Its scope is much more straightforward: It simply aims at 
considering the extent to which the performance of the Greek economy as this is 
expressed by the figures attained or forecasted thus far can be considered to 
compromise between fiscal and external sustainability in terms of coping with the 
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so-called twin-deficit complications. The issue has recently assumed particular 
importance following the final performance assessment of the Greek economy and 
the termination of the so-called Memorandum period with all economic and political 
implications that such a prospect may entail. 
 
The approach we shall follow is the following: After a brief overview of the picture 
concerning the position of the Greek economy as it stands now after a six-year 
recession, we shall embark on an exercise to assess the extent to which both the 
actual and the forecasted figures reflecting its macroeconomic performance in key 
sectors may be considered as being compatible with observing the fiscal and 
external constraint. Assessing the feasibility and realism of these policies shall be 
the main concern of the next section with the results drawn and the policy 
recommendations derived occupying the concluding sections of the paper. 
 
2. In Terms of a Literature Review 
Given that the focus of this note confines itself to the study and evaluation of a 
specific policy issue we have opted to deal with the part of the literature that refers 
chiefly to policy considerations while just touching upon a small number of key 
contributions concerning fundamental concepts like e. g. sustainability. What we 
do, in fact, is deal with the question regarding the extent to which the external 
sector imposes a constraint on fiscal policy and in particular the public debt 
sustainability. By deviating from the well known debt sustainability equation – 
whereby the sustainability of the public debt is constrained by fiscal variables and 
the exogenously given interest payment and growth rate – we point out that the 
sustainability of the public debt is also affected by the external sector performance. 
We shall demonstrate, in fact, that the importance of the external sector role can be 
underlined by extending the well known public debt sustainability equation, 
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formalized by Blanchard et all (1990), to incorporate certain national account 
identities related to the external sector.  
 
The need to enrich the Blanchard equation has arisen following the co-existence of 
the twin-deficits disease in Greece with a substantial high public debt level and high 
GDP growth rates. This inevitably challenges the traditional public-debt-
sustainability analysis and the argument that, achieving high growth rates will 
effectively guarantee a diminishing path in the public debt level. It seems, therefore, 
that the attainment of high GDP growth rates is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a diminishing public debt path which is considerably affected by 
external sector developments. Regarding the latter, therefore, the determination of 
a “sustainable current account threshold” becomes a necessity. This, however, in 
its turn seems to require a definition of a sustainable current account deficit like the 
one provided by Holman (2001)3 or Bussière et al. (2004) who determine a long-
run structural current account position after all cyclical effects have died out. 
 
Getting back to the applied side of the issue, the traditional current account deficits 
of Greece have soared following the country’s Eurozone membership, reaching an 
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average of 11.2 percent of GDP since 1999 culminating to reach 15.6% in 2008, 
partly due to fiscal policy effects as well as to competitiveness deterioration (twin-
deficit hypothesis)4. 
 
Despite the chronic balance of payments problems facing the Greek economy, the 
issue of its current account deficit sustainability has been brought forward only 
during the last decade through papers like Pantazides (1999) and Apergis et al. 
(2000) who agree that the pressure exercised on the burden of the current account 
deficit and the resulting debt accumulation are not enough to cause serious 
disturbances on the basic macroeconomic variables of the country’s economy and 
that such a deficit is therefore sustainable. Nearly a decade later, Zombanakis et al 
(2009) use neural network methodology applied, however, to non-oil data, to reach 
the same conclusion, contrary to Brissimis et al (2010) who find serious indications 
of unsustainability5. Finally there is extensive research on the subject currently 
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have been radical changes concerning the compilation of external sector statistics (the 
exclusion of capital transfers from the current account, the recording of interest payments 
on an accrual rather than on a cash basis).  
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going on by Bardakas (2015) which shows that the current account deficit of 
Greece during the last fifteen years is to its largest extent explained by structural 
factors rather than cyclical ones with the latter gaining some extra explanatory 
power only during the past two years.  
 
The sustainability issue on both its fiscal as well as its external side appears to be a 
major concern of the so-called Troika. Thus the IMF (2013) points out that “External 
debt should decline gradually as a result of projected improvements in the current 
account balance and continued reliance on official financing at low interest rates”. 
The interesting part to note, however, with regard to the external sustainability 
question is that “import compression has resulted in a further shrinking of the 
current account deficit”, while ‘the contribution of the external sector disappointed 
as exports weakened, reflecting soft global demand”. It argues, moreover that 
“risks to external debt sustainability include delayed structural reforms that slow 
competitiveness improvements, slippages in the privatization program, and larger 
than expected deflation”. The EC (2014A), in its turn, forecasts that “the debt 
sustainability analysis points to a slight deterioration in the debt-to-GDP ratio by the 
end of the decade”, after having attained its peak value in 2014 at 177.2%, “as 
clearance of arrears is completed while nominal GDP growth stabilizes, and is then 
expected to steadily decline in 2015 and beyond on the back of stronger fiscal 
balances and the economic recovery” (EC - 2014B). 
 
3. The Model 
Turning first to the fiscal side, the public sector debt can be shown to equal6 
  
    Bt+1 = (1+r)*Bt + Dt    (1) 
                                                                                                                                   
competitiveness, or, instead, as also including non-price components like technology, 
quality, brand name and market knowledge. 
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Where B represents the stock of public debt, D stands for the primary balance and r 
is the effective interest rate, while t is the time indicator throughout this note. 
 
 
Considering, next, the external sector, the balance of goods and services in 
domestic currency terms (TB), following the IMF definition provided by IMF 1993 
and later modified as described in IMF 2009 is taken to equal  
 
TBt = (St-It) - Dt   (2) 
 
where I: Private investment, S: Private savings and D: Primary balance. To 
complete the picture we shall require introducing a net foreign liabilities equation as 
follows (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe, 2014) 
 
Ft+1 = (1+r
*
t+1)*Ft - TBt    (3) 
    
With F standing for net foreign liabilities7 as these are reflected in the International 
Investment Position (IIP) of the economy and r* denoting foreign interest rate.  
 
The question we shall attempt to tackle next is the extent to which debt 
sustainability can stand as a sufficient condition for debt servicing under plausible 
assumptions for the external sector and the macroeconomic environment as these 
are outlined by equations (1) to (3) above.  
 
Combining (1) to (3) yields: 
 
Ft (1+r
*
t+1) - Ft+1 = (St-It) + [Bt (1+r)-Bt+1]  (4) 
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 Net Foreign Liabilities to GDP are considered as a significant predictor of crisis, Catão and 
Milesi- Ferretti (2013), Tressel et al (2014).   
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from which by replacing (St-It) with the current account balance and dividing by GDP 
after the appropriate rearrangements we obtain the debt accumulation equation 
according to which the developments in the external sector of the economy – as 
these are reflected in the current account balance as well as the net foreign 
liabilities - are also affecting the dynamic path of debt as follows:    
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Where b = debt-to-GDP ratio, f = Net foreign liabilities / GDP, cab = current account 
balance / GDP and r* = average foreign nominal interest rate.  
 
 
Considering the debt-to-GDP ratio constraint over time (Δb = 0), it implies: 
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Recalling equation (5) it is obvious that increases in the interest rate affect positively 
the path of the public debt since: 
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Likewise, increases in the net foreign liabilities are directly related to public debt 
increases since:  
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What remains to be considered is the extent to which increases in the growth rate of 
the economy can contribute to reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. Attempting to 
answer this question on the basis of (5) we obtain: 
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Where: 
 
 
 
 
Inequality (10) suggests that the recipe for debt reduction is slightly more 
complicated than what meets the eye. It provides, in fact, that reducing the public 
debt to GDP ratio is a rather demanding task requiring more than just a high growth 
rate. In fact, a reduction-of-debt recipe demands that the current account surplus 
could finance the domestic debt service, as this is depicted by the difference 
between the total public debt service and that of the corresponding foreign liabilities, 
the latter being a potential deterrent to capital inflows and, consequently to 
prospects for investment and growth (Tressel et al. 2014).  
 
One may, therefore, safely argue that the higher the current account surplus and 
the lower the domestic debt service requirements the more effective is the 
contribution of growth to the public debt reduction effort.  
 
The reasoning of this recipe is rather straightforward: A rising domestic debt, 
meaning that the government borrows in the domestic market, leads to crowding out 
investment from private sources (Ali Abbas and Christensen - 2007). In the case of 
),1( ** rR  )1( rR 
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Greece, in particular, in which the access of firms to private funds in a crisis 
environment is limited private lending is expected to be crowded out. Once the 
funds available for private lending have been reduced, then the corresponding 
capital cost will rise. The ensuing absence of FDI will bring about adverse 
repercussions on export - promotion as well as on import - substitution policies thus 
burdening the country’s current account. In such a case, the detrimental effect on 
growth will be reinforced by the fact that the heavy interest burden of the domestic 
debt will deprive the government from devoting resources to growth – promoting 
policies.  
 
4. An Application to the Greek Case 
Greece has been enjoying considerable growth rates reaching as high as about 4% 
during the pre – crisis period thanks almost exclusively to consumption, following 
extensive foreign borrowing. Such tactics, leading to the twin-deficits problem 
marked the way to the country’s effective bankruptcy!  Given the nature of this 
problem facing the Greek economy, one can easily see the need to evaluate our 
debt - reduction recipe considering the sustainability of both the fiscal and the 
external sector sides the results of which have already become evident at the end 
of the period under consideration (see Diagramme 1). 
 
Regarding the former, it appears that the situation is well under control given that 
the IMF baseline projections refer to “contingent relief measures to bring the total 
public debt figure down to 128 percent in 2020” (ΙMF 2014). In the case of the 
external sector the situation may be slightly more complicated. A glance at the IMF 
external sector debt sustainability analysis (IMF 2014) indicates that things are 
looking up depending, however, heavily on the projected current account 
improvement “as competitiveness is restored and Greece continues to rely on 
official loans at relatively low interest rates. The agreed reduction in the GLF 
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interest rate and EFSF fees, and the return of SMP profits will also contribute to the 
sharp improvement in the current account. FDI inflows related to privatization also 
remain an important non-debt-creating source of financing” (IMF 2014). This 
position, however, seems to contradict the findings published by the same source 
(IMF, 2013), according to which “the underlying external position remains relatively 
unfavorable, with the structural current account deficit estimated at about 6 percent 
of GDP in 2012, implying an overvaluation in the CPI-based REER of about 10 
percent” This conclusion agrees with recent research on the topic (Bardakas 2015) 
which points to the fact that the current account surplus attained thus far is to a 
large extent a crisis by-product given the drop of the domestic demand. This finding 
becomes particularly pronounced following the PSI in 2012 and the ensuing surplus 
attained in 2013, a period during which the cyclical component assumes generous 
surplus values. 
 
 It appears, therefore, on the basis of (10), that the efforts of the Greek policy 
makers must focus on holding on to a current account surplus (or at least to a 
minimal current account deficit) together with a domestic debt service minimization. 
A closer look at this two-sided condition points to the following considerations:  
 
Aiming at a current account surplus (or, alternatively, at a minimal current account 
deficit) demands that the goods and services export earnings exceed the goods and 
services import bill (or, alternatively, that the excess of the goods and services 
import bill over the goods and services export earnings has been minimised). 
Nevertheless, the focus on the goods and services balance excludes the incomes 
and transfers accounts. The fact remains, however, that, allowing for the drop of the 
import bill due to the demand decline, the bulk of the current account improvement 
during the crisis has come as a result of both these balances, thanks to the “haircut” 
following the PSI in the case of the former and the ANFA and SMP funds in the 
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case of the latter. Thus while the impact on the economy in all these cases has 
been introduced in (10) via “f”, excluding it from the “cab” allows us to focus on the 
external trade itself and the associated structural problems mainly reflected in the 
performance of the goods exports which leaves a lot to be desired given a number 
of reasons which are beyond the scope of this paper to analyze. It is important to 
mention, however, that Greek exports are measured in terms of total value rather 
than just value added something that overestimates their contribution and 
underlines the seriousness of the problem (Böwer et al. (2014). It is therefore safe 
to argue that a closer look at the domestic production index as well as to that of the 
orders from abroad can lead to a safe export performance forecast. This is a point 
that applied chiefly in the case of goods, as exports of services are affected by 
more or less exogenously determined variables. 
  
This inevitably brings us to the IIP reflected in the liabilities side (f). The traditional 
current account deficits of the Greek economy have always been financed during 
the pre-crisis period by means of portfolio investment, mainly sales of government 
bonds. Since the start of the crisis period, however, the focus has shifted 
dramatically to the “other investment” items which include mainly the generous 
installments of the Troika support, borrowing, that is, with disproportionately low 
interest rates. As the economy moves to recovery, however, the shift must, once 
again move, this time to the direction of the direct investment flows (FDI). 
 
Such a move presupposes the full implementation of the required structural reforms 
as pointed out in Bank of Greece (2014), IMF(2013), Böwer et al. (2014), 
accompanied by a number of easier interventions like lifting the export-firms 
liquidity constraint. Once these have been completed, they are expected to trigger 
the following reaction: Safe long-term investment horizon following the required 
structural reforms leads to structural competitiveness improvement and FDI flows 
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from both domestic (creditless) and foreign sources. This leads in its turn to both 
export promotion and import substitution with substantial benefits for the economy 
and the foreign sector in particular. In fact, the IMF (2013) suggests that “with 
improvements in competitiveness and a stronger contribution from exports, the 
headline current account deficit is projected to improve to about 1 percent of GDP 
this year and the structural deficit to about 5½ percent”. By contrast, as long as the 
current-account surplus target is pursued via domestic demand decline rather than 
via structural reforms the problem will persist in terms of a structural deficit of the 
order of about 5% to 6% according to recent calculations ( IMF 2013)8.   
 
 
 
                                               
8
 The high adjustment cost reflects in important part the delayed, hesitant and piecemeal 
implementation of structural reforms (see Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional 
Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement and 2013 Article IV Consultation). Amidst 
recurrent domestic political crises, vested interests opposed to reforms have been 
increasingly emboldened. Thus, reforms have fallen well short of the critical mass needed 
to transform the investment climate. In fact, as indicated by the IMF (2013), “Structural 
reforms are progressing slowly….., while the privatization program is behind schedule….. 
Progress in liberalizing regulated professions has been slower than targeted, particularly in 
issuing secondary legislation for a number of professions, reflecting resistance from vested 
interests……On judicial reforms, the implementation of the anti-corruption plan and the 
preparation of a draft Code of Civil Procedure have been delayed”. The corruption problem 
has assumed tremendous dimensions in terms of economic costs (about 7% per year). An 
excellent study on the problem is found in Azariades et al. (2010). 
 
Position of Diagramme 1: The Fiscal and External Sustainability Problem of Greece 
in Figures 
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5. Conclusions 
This note has shown that a high growth rate may be necessary, but not sufficient in 
terms of a debt-reduction recipe. We have shown, in fact, that reducing the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio demands that the current account surplus exceeds the internal 
debt service, as this is depicted by the difference between the total public debt 
service and that of the foreign liabilities. The rule may be certainly applicable to 
other Eurozone country cases as well, but one cannot help pointing out that the 
Greek economy, more than any other, has suffered a painful experience during the 
pre-crisis period when it ignored this recipe. As a consequence the generous rates 
of growth attained almost exclusively thanks to consumption following extensive 
credit expansion and foreign borrowing led to the twin deficits disease. 
 
Focusing on the condition, its first leg requires that the goods and services export 
earnings exceed the goods and services import bill (or, alternatively, that the goods 
and services export earnings growth is higher that the growth rate of the goods and 
services import bill). Turning to its second leg, this requires reducing the internal 
debt service in which case attention is inevitably drawn to the possibility of attracting 
FDI flows from abroad together with boosting up the Public Investment Programmes 
targeted to infrastructure works (IMF, 2014). Following the IMF, “the onus remains 
on delivering rapidly on structural reforms to unlock growth and create jobs, which 
would lessen the pain of further adjustment” (IMF 2013).  
 
What remains to be seen, therefore, is the extent to which the policy makers shall 
decide on lessening the pain of further adjustment despite the vested interests 
opposed to the reforms required.  
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Diagramme 1: The Fiscal and External Sustainability Problem of Greece in Figures 
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